Abstract. A recent framework for chosen IV statistical distinguishing analysis of stream ciphers is exploited and formalized to provide new methods for key recovery attacks. As an application, a key recovery attack on simplified versions of two eSTREAM Phase 3 candidates is given: For Grain-128 with IV initialization reduced to up to 180 of its 256 iterations, and for Trivium with IV initialization reduced to up to 672 of its 1152 iterations, it is experimentally demonstrated how to deduce a few key bits. Evidence is given that the present analysis is not applicable on Grain-128 or Trivium with full IV initialization.
Introduction
Synchronous stream ciphers are symmetric cryptosystems which are suitable in software applications with high throughput requirements, or in hardware applications with restricted resources (such as limited storage, gate count, or power consumption). For synchronization purposes, in many protocols the message is divided into short frames where each frame is encrypted using a different publicly known initialization vector (IV) and the same secret key. Stream ciphers should be designed to resist attacks that exploit many known keystreams generated by the same key but different chosen IVs. In general, the key and the IV is mapped to the initial state of the stream cipher by an initialization function (and the automaton produces then the keystream bits, using an output and update function). The security of the initialization function relies on its mixing (or diffusion) properties: each key and IV bit should affect each initial state bit in a complex way. This can be achieved with a round-based approach, where each round consists of some nonlinear operations. On the other hand, using a large number of rounds or highly involved operations is inefficient for applications with frequent resynchronizations. Limited resources of hardware oriented stream ciphers may even preclude the latter, and good mixing should be achieved with simple Boolean functions and a well-chosen number of rounds. In [4, 8, 9, 6 ], a framework for chosen IV statistical analysis of stream ciphers is suggested to investigate the structure of the initialization function. If mixing is not perfect, then the initialization function has an algebraic normal form (ANF) which can be distinguished from a uniformly random Boolean function. Particularly the coefficients of high degree monomials in the IV (i.e. the product of many IV bits) are suspect to some biased distribution: it will take many operations before all these IV bits meet in the same memory cell. In [4] , this question was raised: "It is an open question how to utilize these weaknesses of state bits to attack the cipher.". The aim of this paper is to contribute to this problem and present a framework to mount key recovery attacks. As in [4, 8] one selects a subset of IV bits as variables. Assuming all other IV values as well as the key fixed, one can write a keystream symbol as a Boolean function. By running through all possible values of these bits and generating a keystream output each time, one can compute the truth table of this Boolean function. Each coefficient in the algebraic normal form of this Boolean function is parametrized by the bits of the secret key. Based on the idea of probabilistic neural bits from [1] , we now examine if every key bit in the parametrized expression of a coefficient does occur, or more generally, how much influence each key bit does have on the value of the coefficient. If a coefficient depends on less than all key bits, this fact can be exploited to filter those keys which do not satisfy the imposed value for the coefficient. It is shown in [10] that for eSTREAM Phase 3 candidate Trivium with IV initialization reduced to 576 iterations, linear relations on the key bits can be derived for well chosen sets of variable IV bits. Our framework is more general, as it works with the concept of (probabilistic) neutral key bits, i.e. key bits which have no influence on the value of a coefficient with some (high) probability. This way, we can get information on the key for many more iterations in the IV initialization of Trivium, and similarly for the eSTREAM Phase 3 candidate Grain-128. On the other hand, extensive experimental evidence indicates clear limits to our approach: With our methods, it is unlikely to get information on the key faster than exhaustive key search for Trivium or Grain-128 with full IV initialization.
Problem Formalization
Suppose that we are given a fixed Boolean function F (K, V ) : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} m → {0, 1}. An oracle chooses a random and unknown K = (k 0 , . . . , k n−1 ) and returns us the value of z = F (K, V ) for every query V = (v 0 , . . . , v m−1 ) of our choice (and fixed K). The function F could stand e.g. for the Boolean function which maps the key K and IV V of a stream cipher to the (let say) first output bit. Our goal as an adversary is to determine the unknown key K (or to distinguish F from a random function) in the chosen IV attack model only by dealing with the function F . If F mixes its inputs in a proper way, then one needs to try all 2 n possible keys in the worst case by sending O(n) queries to the oracle in order to find the correct key (since each query gives one bit information about the key for a balanced F ). Here, we are going to investigate methods which can potentially lead to faster reconstruction of the key in the case where the function F does not properly mix its inputs. This could occur for example when the initialization phase of a stream cipher is performed through an iterated procedure for which the number of iterations has not been suitably chosen. On the other hand these methods may help to give the designers more insight to choose the required number of iterations. The existence of faster methods for finding the unknown key K highly depends on the structure of F . It may be even impossible to uniquely determine the key
for the multi-index κ = (κ 0 , . . . , κ n−1 ) (which can also be identified by its integer representation). Then the following lemma makes this statement more clear.
Lemma 1.
No adversary can distinguish between the two keys K 1 and K 2 for which K
Indeed, it is only possible to determine the values of {K κ |∀κ, C κ (V ) = 0} which is not necessarily equivalent to determination of K. As a consequence of Lemma 1, the function F divides {0, 1} n into equivalence classes:
. See Ex. 3 as an application on a reduced version of Trivium.
Scenarios of Attacks
The algebraic description of the function F (K, V ) is too complex in general to be amenable to direct analysis. Therefore, from the function F (K, V ) and with the partition V = (U, W ) we derive simpler Boolean functions C(K, W ) with the help of the oracle. In our main example, C(K, W ) is a coefficient of the algebraic normal form of the function deduced from F by varying over the bits in U only, see Sect. 4 for more details. If this function C(K, W ) does not have a well-distributed algebraic structure, it can be exploited in cryptanalytic attacks. Let us investigate different scenarios:
1. If C(K, W ) is imbalanced for (not necessarily uniformly) random W and many fixed K, then the function F (or equivalently the underlying stream cipher) with unknown K can be distinguished from a random one, see [4, 8, 9, 6 ]. 2. If C(K, W ) is evaluated for some fixed W , then C(K, W ) is an expression in the key bits only. In [10] , it was shown that in Trivium case for reduced iterations, linear relations on the key bits can be derived for a well chosen IV part. 3. If C(K, W ) has many key bits, which have (almost) no influence on the values of C(K, W ), a suitable approximation may be identified and exploited for key recovery attacks, see [1] . This is the target scenario of this paper and will be discussed in detail.
Scenario 1 has already been discussed in the introduction. In scenario 2, the underlying idea is to find a relation C(K, W ), evaluated for some fixed W , which depends only on a subset of t (< n) key bits. The functional form of this relation can be determined with 2 t evaluations of C(K, W ). By trying all 2 t possibilities for the involved t key bits, one can filter those keys which do not satisfy the imposed relation. The complexity of this precomputation is 2 t times needed to compute C(K, W ), see Sect. 4. More precisely, if p = Pr{C(K, W ) = 0} for the fixed W , the key space is filtered by a factor of
For example, in the case of a linear function it is p = H(p) = 1/2. In addition, if several imposed relations on the key bits are available, it is easier to combine them to filter wrong keys if they have a simple structure, see e.g. [10] . In scenario 3, the main idea is to find a function A(L, W ) which depends on a key part L of t bits, and which is correlated to C(K, W ) with correlation coefficient ε, that is Pr{C(K, W ) = A(L, W )} = 1/2(1 + ε). Then, by asking the oracle N queries we get some information (depending on the new equivalence classes produced by A) about t bits of the secret K in time N2
t by carefully analyzing the underlying hypothesis testing problem. We will proceed by explaining how to derive such functions C from the coefficients of the ANF of F in Sect. 4, and how to find such functions A using the concept of probabilistic neutral bits in Sect. 5.
Derived Functions from Polynomial Description
The function F can be written in the form F (K, V ) = ν,κ C ν,κ V ν K κ with binary coefficients C ν,κ . We can make a partition of the IV according to V = (U,
Note that an adversary with the help of the oracle can evaluate C α (K, W ) for the unknown key K at any input W ∈ {0, 1} m−l for every α ∈ {0, 1} l by sending at most 2 l queries to the oracle. In other words, the partitioning of V has helped us to define a computable function C α (K, W ) for small values of l, even though the explicit form of C α (K, W ) remains unknown. To obtain the values C α (K, W ) for all α ∈ {0, 1} l , an adversary asks for the output values of all 2 l inputs V = (U, W ) with the fixed part W . This gives the truth table of a Boolean function in l variables for which the coefficients of its ANF (i.e. the values of C α (K, W )) can be found in time l2 l and memory 2 l using the Walsh-Hadamard transform. Alternatively, a single coefficient C α (K, W ) for a specific α ∈ {0, 1} l can be computed by XORing the output of F for all 2 |α| inputs V = (U, W ) for which each bit of U is at most as large as the corresponding bit of α. This bypasses the need of 2 l memory. One can expect that a subset of IV bits receives less mixing during the initialization process than other bits. These IV bits are called weak, and they would be an appropriate choice of U in order to amplify the non-randomness of C. However, it is an open question how to identify weak IV bits by systematic methods.
Functions Approximation
We are interested in the approximations of a given function C(K, W ) : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} m−l → {0, 1} which depend only on a subset of key bits. To this end we make an appropriate partition of the key K according to K = (L, M) with L containing t significant key bits and M containing the remaining (n − t) non-significant key bits, and construct the function A(L, W ). We also use the term subkey to refer to the set of significant key bits. Such a partitioning can be identified by systematic methods, using the concept of probabilistic neutral bits from [1] : Definition 1. The neutrality measure of the key bit k i with respect to the function C(K, W ) is defined as γ i , where Pr = (1 + γ i ) is the probability (over all K and W ) that complementing the key bit k i does not change the output of C(K, W ).
In practice, we will set a threshold γ, such that all key bits with |γ i | < γ are included in the subkey L (i.e. the probabilistic neutral key bits are chosen according to the individual values of their neutrality measure). The approximation A(L, W ) could be defined by C(K, W ) with non-significant key bits M fixed to zero. Here is another toy example to illustrate the method:
For uniformly random K and W , we find γ 0 = 1/8, γ 1 = 1/8, γ 2 = 7/8. Consequently, it is reasonable to use L := (k 0 , k 1 ) as the subkey. With fixed k 2 = 0, we obtain the approximation A(L, W ) = k 0 v 1 ⊕ k 1 v 0 which depends on t = 2 key bits only.
⊓ ⊔ Note that, if M consists only of neutral key bits (with γ i = 1), then the approximation A is exact, because C(K, W ) does not depend on these key bits. In [1] the notion of probabilistic neutral bits was used to derive an approximation function A in the case of W = V and C = F which lead to the first break of Salsa20/8.
Description of the Attack
In the precomputation phase of the attack, we need a suitable partitioning of the IV and the key (i.e. a function C and an approximation A). The weak IV bits are often found by a random search, while the weak key bits can be easily found with the neutrality measure for some threshold γ. Given C and A, we can find a small subset of candidates for the subkey L with a probabilistic guess-and-determine attack. In order to filter the set of all 2 t possible subkeys into a smaller set, we need to distinguish a correct guess of the subkeyL from an incorrect one. Our ability in distinguishing subkeys is related to the correlation coefficient between A(L, W ) and C(K, W ) with K = (L, M) under the following two hypotheses. H 0 : the guessed partL is correct, and H 1 : the guessed partL is incorrect. More precisely, the values of ε 0 and ε 1 defined in the following play a crucial role:
In general, both ε 0 and ε 1 are random variables, depending on the key. In the case that the distributions of ε 0 and ε 1 are separated, we can achieve a small non-detection probability p mis and false alarm probability p fa by using enough samples. In the special case where ε 0 and ε 1 are constants with ε 0 > ε 1 , the optimum distinguisher is NeymanPearson [2] . Then, N values of C(K, W ) for different W (assuming that the samples C(K, W ) are independent) are sufficient to obtain p fa = 2 −c and p mis = 1.3 × 10 −3 , where
The attack will be successful with probability 1 − p mis and the complexity is as follows: For each guessL of the subkey, the correlation ε of A(L, W ) ⊕ C(K, W ) must be computed, which requires computation of the coefficients A(L, W ) by the adversary, and computation of the coefficient C(K, W ) through the oracle, for the same N values of W , having a cost of N2 l at most. This must be repeated for all 2 t possible guessesL. The set of candidates for the subkey L has a size of about p fa 2 t = 2 t−c . The whole key can then be verified by an exhaustive search over the key part M with a cost of 2 t−c 2 n−t evaluations of F . The total complexity becomes N2 l 2 t + 2 t−c 2 n−t = N2 l+t + 2 n−c . Using more than one function C or considering several chosen IV bits U may be useful to reduce complexity; however, we do not deal with this case here. Remark 1. In practice, the values of ε 0 and ε 1 are key dependent. If the key is considered as a random variable, then ε 0 and ε 1 are also random variables. However, their distribution may not be fully separated, and hence a very small p mis and p fa may not be possible to achieve. We propose the following non-optimal distinguisher: first, we choose a threshold ε ⋆ 1 are close, then the estimated number of samples becomes very large. In this case, it is better to choose the number of samples intuitively, and then estimate the related p fa .
Remark 2.
It is reasonable to assume that a false subkeyL, which is close to the correct subkey, may lead to a larger value of ε. Here, the measure for being "close" could be the neutrality measure γ i and the Hamming weight: if only a few key bits on positions with large γ i are false, one would expect that ε is large. However, we only observed an irregular (i.e. not continuous) deviation for very close subkeys. The effect on p fa is negligible because subkeys with difference of low weight are rare.
Application to Trivium
The stream cipher Trivium [3] is one of the eSTREAM candidates with a 288-bit internal state consisting of three shift registers of different lengths. At each round, a bit is shifted into each of the three shift registers using a non-linear combination of taps from that and one other register; and then one bit of output is produced. To initialize the cipher, the n = 80 key bits and m = 80 IV bits are written into two of the shift registers, with the remaining bits being set to a fixed pattern. The cipher state is then updated R = 18 × 64 = 1152 times without producing output in order to provide a good mixture of the key and IV bits in the initial state. We consider the Boolean function F (K, V ) which computes the first keystream bit after r rounds of initialization. In [4] , Trivium was analyzed with chosen IV statistical tests and nonrandomness was detected for r = 10 × 64, 10.5 × 64, 11 × 64, 11.5 × 64 rounds with l = 13, 18, 24, 33 IV bits, respectively. In [10] , the key recovery attack on Trivium was investigated with respect to scenario 2 (see Sect. 3) for r = 9 × 64. Here we provide more examples for key recovery attack with respect to scenario 3 for r = 10 × 64 and r = 10.5 × 64. In the following two examples, weak IV bits have been found by a random search. We first concentrate on equivalence classes of the key: For r = 10×64 rounds, a variable IV part U with the l = 11 bit positions {1, 5, 7, 9, 12, 14, 16, 22, 24, 27, 29}, and the coefficient with index α = 2047, the derived function C α (K, W ) depends on all 80 key bits. A more careful look at the neutrality measure of the key bits reveals that max(γ i ) ≈ 0.35 and only 7 key bits have a neutrality measure larger than γ = 0.18, which is not enough to get a useful approximation A(L, W ) for an attack. However, we observed that C α (K, W ) is independent of the key for W = 0, and more generally the number of significant bits depends on |W |. ⊓ ⊔
It is difficult to find a good choice of variable IV's for larger values of r, using a random search. The next example shows how we can go a bit further with some insight.
Example 5. Now we consider r = 10.5 × 64 = 10 × 64 + 32 = 672 rounds. The construction of the initialization function of Trivium suggests that shifting the bit positions of U in Ex. 4 may be a good choice. Hence we choose U with the l = 11 bit positions {33, 37, 39, 41, 44, 46, 48, 54, 56, 59, 61}, and α = 2047. In this case, C α (K, W ) for W = 0 is independent of 32 key bits, and p = Pr{C α (K, 0) = 1} ≈ 0.42. This is already a reduced attack which is 1/H(p) ≈ 1.95 times faster than exhaustive search.
⊓ ⊔
The following example shows how we can connect a bridge between scenarios 2 and 3 and come up with an improved attack. is satisfied here.
⊓ ⊔
